

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE NEWEST EXISTENTIAL CONTEXTS

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Abstract

The relevance of the concept of responsibility, in terms of the relationship between its personal and collective dimensions, is due to the importance of understanding of responsibility as a civic virtue and an essential characteristic of human existence under the conditions of Ukraine's modern struggle for its existence. The attempt proposed by modern philosophy to single out the most essential components of the philosophical conceptualization of the idea of responsibility appears as an awareness of the impossibility of a just, humane resolution of social and intercultural conflicts without due mutual respect, recognition of the dignity of their participants, and provides opportunities for further development of the problem of responsibility in the context of problems of justice and freedom.

Keywords: *responsibility, justice, ethics, communication.*

INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of responsibility should be investigated not only as a theoretical and practical problem, interpreted through the prism of problems freedom and justice, as well as in the newest, primarily existential contexts. Though, as M. Riedel emphasizes, it is precisely in the concept of responsibility coexist linguistic and real relationships. However, for the actual philosophical discourse of responsibility on the European expanses became fundamental works of the famous German philosopher K.-O. Apel, which are characterized by both unconditional significance and certain limits.

EXPOSITION

First of all, it should be noted that the fruitfulness of Apel's concept of responsibility, in terms of the relationship between its personal and collective dimensions, is determined by the importance of understanding of responsibility as a civic virtue and essential

characteristics of human existence, under the conditions of Ukraine's struggle for its own existence. Trying to move relentlessly in the ravine of critical to the social existence of the ethics of responsibility evidences the last life story of Apel's book "Transcendental Reflection and History" [2]. Discourse of Apel's responsibility is based on the following ideas and principles. Firstly, in his opinion, collective irresponsibility should be replaced by collective responsibility based on the new philosophical anthropology, the centre of which should be a responsible person. However, the "crisis of mind", which Apel was so eager to overcome, tragically appeared without him, in front of us, acquired new terrifying dimensions: when intolerance towards the other, special existence became not just illegal or immoral, but frankly irresponsible and criminal.

Secondly, exactly in the defined by us existential aspect of the problem of responsibility, as one of the most important theoretical and practical problems of today,

is formed the internal evolution of Apel's thoughts about responsibility to the analysis of co-responsibility. Despite his statement that the principle of co-responsibility is rooted in personal responsibility, the issue of collective relations and personal responsibility (especially in the context of Putin's crimes regime against humanity, against the civilian population) remains open and definitely involves both personal and collective responsibility.

Exactly this thesis about conscious human (and especially inhuman, antihuman) actions for which a person is responsible have already been expressed in discussions about the limits of Apel's transcendentalism. In particular, in the introduction to the work "Democracy in an Age of Globalisation", O. Höffe emphasizes the importance of mutual connection of the principle of justice and responsibility: "Self-organization and responsibility become complete in qualified democracy: if the social subject truly becomes legal and it justifies the implementation of its self-organization. But when it is also connected with the principles of justice, it is not just about capacity for responsibility, but also about real responsibility" [3, p. 9].

Apel's appeal to problems of justice in the aspect of responsibility in the section "Problem of justice in a multicultural society" above mentioned work. However, here arises the question: who, in front of whom, and to what extent responsible? But, in the end, answering this question, come out beyond the limits of expanded, but somewhat naive utopian vision of responsibility failed not only Apel's, but also his students and followers, in particular D. Böhler.

Thirdly, in borders of his variant of the transcendental transformation paradigms of philosophical thinking K.-O. Apel distinguishes two layers intersubjective community: a layer of empirically, historically formed harmony and interaction (actual a priori belonging to the real communicative communities), on the one

hand, and the normative-ideal layer (regulatory a priori ideal communicative community), on the other hand, as the only possible one the "regulatory principle" of true free understanding.

Understanding, which makes it possible to go beyond the limits of communicative unfreedom, which is no longer appears as irresistible and important as the classics of communication thought philosophy. Therefore, the problem of overcoming arises in modern philosophy depending on the domination (in various forms of restrictions and pressure) of a certain class or groups or countries over other people. It's about creating real conditions for the ability to think freely and not depend on too concrete communities that impose prejudices, metanarratives, behavioural algorithms and ways of being based on violence rather than justice, rights and freedoms. According to Apel, in order not to run into injustice or manipulation, each participant in real interaction must be in advance capable of considering an ideal communicative society (or community argumentative): that is, every "speech-capable" person who is in the process of socialization and mastering the language at the same time acquired a "communicative competence", being in the verity, must maintain this state of affairs through "transcendental reflection". Apel also claims that through recognition and respect for the main norm of argumentative discourse: equality and joint responsibility of all its participants, perhaps justify the complementarity of the two main ideal-typical positions of modern practical philosophy: universally ethics of justice and pragmatic-Aristotelian ethics of the good life [1].

It is about current somehow utopian ethics of joint global responsibility and communicative interaction of interests and discussion of crisis situations.

CONCLUSION

The above mentioned enables to make several conclusions: first, responsibility in

extreme situations appears as a desire to protect our own living space, which indicates its existential modality. It goes about responsibility as a form of collective and individual care the identity and inadequacy of Apel's mainly linguistic-communicative meaning of his discourse of responsibility and co-responsibility, even his idea of substantiating "planetary macroethics" remained helpless before the new social challenges. Secondly, as the main one we consider the necessity to complement Apel's interpretation of responsibility by understanding, researching of its new levels, particularly in the sense of suggested by K. Jaspers concept of guilty: political, metaphysical, and moral [5]. It is important even if the guilt refers to the past and the responsibility directed to the future.

It is also worth emphasizing the methodological and practical aspects of thinking about the legal dimension of personal and collective responsibility and their national life-world context. In particular O. Höffe does not simply proceed from the fact that "an individual has both a right and an obligation of his own responsibility and self-help" [3, p. 115], and responsibility for helping those who need it is an organic component of human dignity.

He supplements this reasoning with the following fundamentally important theses: readiness for responsibility is possible only to reprehensible people, subjects of law. To become like that, requires legal integrity, recognition of oneself and others as subjects of the law, which can be brings to justice for unlawful actions. "It is necessary to realize the good (such that correspond to the law) and bad (unlawful) legal acts, to admit prudence, and not only in words, but also in deed, thanks to the corresponding way of life" [3, p. 72]. Regarding the relationship of responsibility collective and personal, it should be said that "the national state takes over responsibility for the negative consequences of economic development: it, through social insurance, turns into a solidarity community... And

even such a defender of the post-national as Habermas agrees that only national consciousness transforms lieges into citizens who feel responsible for each other" [Ibid., p. 158]. Thus, the attempt proposed by modern philosophy highlighting the most essential components of the philosophical conceptualization of the idea of responsibility appears as an awareness of the impossibility of fair, human resolution of social and intercultural conflicts without proper mutual respect, recognition of the dignity of their participants and provides opportunities for further development of the problem of responsibility in the context of problems of justice, freedom and guilt. Inevitable responsibility becomes, must become a "moral compass" not just complex and tragic world. A world that actualizes not only responsibility to future generations for the environment, climate changes, but also for the consequences of aggressive, criminal actions, which are worth thousands and thousands human lives. The thesis about what responsibility is worthy of attention the basis of freedom. The essence of this provision is that "taking over self-responsibility, in any case when personal participation is possible one or another life event, each of us, that is, each person, can realize oneself as responsible and, in this sense, free" [4, p. 82]. In freedom, the reality of responsibility is revealed: a person is "convicted, doomed" not so much to freedom as to taking responsibility, without this the struggle for equality and justice can do end with the destruction of what contributes to their implementation" [4, p. 82].

Distinguishing monologue and dialogic responsibility is not easy involves the recognition of the existence of other personal and social, collective existence, actualizes the problem of human dignity.

It is also important to emphasize that deepening interest in primarily concerns issues of the relationship of responsibility and human dignity national philosophy caused by the tragic events of our lives,

events that became as destructive, existentially significant as and events of the Second World War. It is about the desire for humiliation and physical destruction not just of individual people, but of the whole nation, our Ukrainian people. And again the question arises about how this could have happened and what should be done to prevent this from happening again in the future? And also – about responsibility, moral, metaphysical and legal, of all agents and ideologues of unheard in our century on the territory of Europe crimes against humanity.

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